Abstract
People with intellectual disabilities are commonly seen as “nonadult others” and as persons of limited credibility, and this view has implications in a number of areas. In this paper, the empirical findings from an interview study focused on lived experience are analyzed in relation to the intersections of intellectual disability and gender. In light of Fricker’s (2007) work on epistemic injustice, and in recognition of Anderson’s (2012) emphasis on the importance of transactional and structural injustice, a novel aspect of epistemic injustice is provided: as a consequence of conditioned lived space. The social identity of intellectual disability position persons thus identified to belong to a segregated and marginalized group. Although guided by the ambition to care for and protect this vulnerable group, structural transactions provided by the welfare system run the risk of simultaneously depriving individuals of both the experiences and the hermeneutical resources necessary to interpretatively frame and make sense of their limited situation and lack of possibilities – and thus from interacting epistemically in fruitful ways. A key structural feature of the epistemic injustice towards the group is shown to be a lived experience that to a large extent is conditioned by the constructions of disability and gender.
Recommended Citation
Kalman, Hildur; Lovgren, Veronica; and Sauer, Lennart
(2016)
"Epistemic Injustice and Conditioned Experience: The Case of Intellectual Disability,"
Wagadu: A Journal of Transnational Women's & Gender Studies: Vol. 15:
Iss.
1, Article 4.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.cortland.edu/wagadu/vol15/iss1/4